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1 Introduction
In a very inuential paper, Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) have shown
that the welfare gains from trade implied by a very large class of models depend on
only two su¢ cient statistics: (i) the share of expenditure on domestic goods (which is
often called "domestic trade share"); and (ii) the elasticity of imports with respect to
variable trade costs ("trade elasticity"). This result is remarkable because it applies
to frameworks as di¤erent as the simple Armington model, in which goods are di¤er-
entiated by country of origin; the Ricardian model with heterogeneous industries and
Fréchet-distributed e¢ ciencies of Eaton and Kortum (2002); the monopolistic compe-
tition model of Krugman (1980); as well as variants of the monopolistic competition
model of Melitz (2003), with heterogeneous rms and Pareto-distributed e¢ ciencies
(such as those developed by Chaney, 2008, and Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz, 2011).
Given their importance for empirical studies, these models are now commonly referred
to as "quantitative trade models."
Following this result, the literature appears to be taking two main directions. One
analyzes how the measurement of the gains from trade changes when some assumptions
of quantitative trade models are relaxed (see Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson, and
Rodríguez-Clare, 2012, and Melitz and Redding, 2013 and 2014). The other focuses on
the empirical implications of the result. In particular, it is now clear that the various
models have di¤erent implications for the estimated value of the trade elasticity, so
that even though the analytical formulation of the gains from trade is the same, the
resulting quantication still di¤ers across models (Simonovska and Waugh, 2014a).
In this paper we explore a di¤erent route, by focusing on the sources of the
welfare gains of the open economy with respect to the autarky economy. In particular,
we study whether quantitative trade models allow us to quantify not only the overall
welfare gains, but also the contribution of the di¤erent sources. This is a key issue in
both the theoretical and the empirical literature in international trade. The matter is
also critical for policy purposes. By understanding what are the most important sources
of the welfare gains, countries could design and implement appropriate policies in order
to maximize the benets from trade liberalization and foster economic development.
Answering this question, however, is in general very di¢ cult, because di¤erent
quantitative models entail di¤erent predictions on the sources of the welfare gains.
For example, gains from consuming a greater variety of goods are key in Armington
and monopolistic competition models, but are absent in Ricardian models. Given
these sharp di¤erences, we analyze this question for one specic family of models and
investigate whether belonging to the class of quantitative trade models facilitates the
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measurement of the contribution of the di¤erent sources.
The family on which we focus is the Ricardian model with many countries and
goods, CES preferences, and general distributions of industry e¢ ciencies. Thus, with
respect to Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012), although we restrict the
attention to only one family of models, we extend the scope of the analysis by providing
general results for Ricardian models in which industry e¢ ciencies follow a generic
distribution, and not necessarily a Fréchet.
For this general family of models, we show that the welfare gains of the open
economy with respect to the autarky economy can always be decomposed into two
distinct sources: a selection and a reallocation e¤ect. The former is the e¤ect on average
e¢ ciency of the selection of industries that, thanks to their su¢ ciently low marginal
costs of production relative to foreign industries, survive international competition.
Such average e¢ ciency is computed by considering, for the sole industries that survive
international competition, the same relative weights in domestic production as the
autarky economy. The latter e¤ect, instead, is related to the rise in the weight in
domestic production of the exporting industries, which is due to the reallocation of
workers away from the less-e¢ cient non-exporting industries to the industries that
start servicing the foreign market.
While the model provides very precise theoretical denitions for both e¤ects,
their analytical expression is, in general, too cumbersome to be used for empirical
purposes. In most applications, in fact, it would require computing several billions
of distributions of e¢ ciencies. By contrast, this decomposition simplies dramatically
if we impose that industry e¢ ciencies are Fréchet distributed  the assumption that
makes our Ricardian model belong to the class of quantitative trade models. Under
this assumption, we can derive exact model-based measures of these two e¤ects, which
can be quantied using only data on trade ows and domestic production.
The Fréchet assumption entails this simplication for the following reasons. First,
it allows us to easily quantify the gains from trade, as shown by Arkolakis, Costinot,
and Rodríguez-Clare (2012). Second, it implies that the selection e¤ect is a measurable
share of the overall gains from trade, making it possible to obtain the contribution to
welfare of this e¤ect. Third, as a consequence, the reallocation e¤ect (whose quan-
tication is, in the general case, extremely di¢ cult) can be calculated simply as the
complement of the selection e¤ect. Therefore, a key insight of our analysis is that quan-
titative trade models seem to be useful not only to assess the overall welfare gains, but
also to properly measure their sources.
Using the Fréchet assumption, we also demonstrate that, when the gains from
trade are small and there are still few exporters in the domestic economy, the largest
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share of the welfare gains is due to the selection e¤ect. As the export sector grows
and the gains from trade increase, the importance of the reallocation e¤ect also rises.
Because the contribution of the reallocation e¤ect rises with the size of the overall
gains from trade, it follows that the factors a¤ecting the former are exactly the same
factors a¤ecting the latter. In particular, both the welfare gains and the contribution
of the reallocation e¤ect are higher for small, open and very productive economies,
located near to markets that are large, rich, and less productive and, therefore, easier
to penetrate. Another interesting feature of our result is that the specic value of the
trade elasticity, which is key to determine the overall welfare gains, does not a¤ect the
shares of the gains pertaining to the selection and the reallocation e¤ect, making their
measurement even more straightforward and robust than that of the welfare gains.
A quantication for a sample of 46 advanced and developing economies in the
years 2000 and 2005 shows that the selection e¤ect is, on average, somewhat more
important than the reallocation e¤ect (accounting for about 60% of the gains from
trade). In particular, the selection e¤ect is dominant for large countries: only in
the United States and Japan, among the advanced economies, and in Brazil, Russia,
India, and China, among the developing countries, does the share of gains pertaining
to the selection e¤ect exceeds 80 percent. However, for small open economies such
as Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, it is the
reallocation e¤ect that is dominant, as it is responsible for over 70 percent of the gains.
These ndings have important policy implications. Suppose that the export sector
is less similar to other sectors of the economy in terms of, for example, skills that are
required to workers, as documented by the empirical literature.1 This feature of the
export sector could make resource reallocation from other industries slower or more
di¢ cult. In this case, our theoretical and empirical results suggest that, in the initial
stages of trade liberalization (i.e. when trade barriers are still high), these frictions do
not prevent to reap the benets from trade, because most of the gains obtain from the
selection e¤ect, that is from the closure of less e¢ cient industries and the reallocation of
workers across all the surviving industries, which are mostly non-exporters. Similarly,
large countries can expect to enjoy welfare gains almost in full, even in the hypothesis
of a cumbersome reallocation to the export sector, thanks to the considerable size of
their non-exporting industries. On the other hand, reallocation of workers to the export
sector is crucial in small open economies. Therefore, to fully benet from trade, these
countries must be ready to favor resource reallocation to this sector, in particular by
enhancing education and training for unskilled workers.
1Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007) show, in fact, that exporting rms are more skill
intensive than their domestic competitors.
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Our paper is related to several strands of the literature. Many recent empiri-
cal and theoretical studies have focused on one specic source of the welfare gains,
that is aggregate productivity. An early example is Pavcnik (2002), who estimates
productivity improvements in Chile using rm-level data. This study conrms the im-
portance of the mechanisms described in this paper, as it nds that the exit of plants
and the reshu­ ing of resources from less e¢ cient to more e¢ cient producers are the
main sources of the productivity gains. Many other papers, instead, have focused on
model-based measures of the "productivity gains from trade," computed as increases
in average e¢ ciency.2 To better grasp the link between these papers and our own, it
is worth recalling that, in the Ricardian model, the growth in world-wide aggregate
productivity induced by international trade is the basic source of the welfare gains for
all countries. In other words, countries benet from the fact that, by specializing in the
production of the goods for which they have a comparative advantage, the world pro-
duction of the optimal consumption bundle increases. Thus, our paper sheds light on
how each individual country, through the mechanisms of selection and reallocation in-
duced by trade liberalization, contributes to the improvement in world-wide aggregate
productivity and reaps the benets of international trade for its own welfare.
Another related strand of the literature is the wave of papers focusing on empir-
ical estimates of the gains from trade, such as Feenstra (1994 and 2010), Broda and
Weinstein (2006), Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik, and Topalova (2009), and many
others. These papers use di¤erent econometric techniques to quantify either the con-
tribution of specic sources of gains (usually those from consuming new varieties) or
the size of the overall welfare gains. Our approach, instead, grounded on the derivation
of model-based measures of the welfare gains, follows more closely the one of Eaton
and Kortum (2002), Alvarez and Lucas (2007), Arkolakis, Demidova, Klenow, and
Rodríguez-Clare (2008), Ravikumar and Waugh (2009), and Arkolakis, Costinot, and
Rodríguez-Clare (2012). Unlike those papers, however, we are also able to quantify the
contribution of the di¤erent sources of gains.3
Given that a big chunk of the related literature focuses on welfare gains in mo-
2See, for example, Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003), Costinot, Donaldson, and Ko-
munjer (2012), Bolatto (2013), Finicelli, Pagano and Sbracia (2013a and 2013b), and Levchenko and
Zhang (2013).
3A close relative of our study is also the paper by Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare (2009), who
decompose the welfare gains from trade of a small open economy under monopolistic competition
into four terms: productivity, terms of trade, number of varieties, and curvature (i.e. the degree of
heterogeneity across varieties). Here, instead, we consider a general equilibrium model with perfect
competition and, most importantly, we derive a quantiable expression of the two sources that, in our
Ricardian framework, provide the welfare gains.
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nopolistic competition models à la Melitz (2003), it is worth clarifying the di¤erences
between these frameworks and the Ricardian one. On the production side, the adjust-
ment that takes place after trade liberalization is very similar in the two frameworks.
In both models, in fact, domestic production: (i) focuses only on a subset of the goods
that were made under autarky (these are the goods that are made more e¢ ciently with
monopolistic competition, and those in which the country has a comparative advantage
in Ricardo); (ii) becomes tilted towards exporters (who benet from foreign demand).
On the consumption side, according to both models households consume less of those
tradeable goods whose production remains domestic; however: (a) in the Ricardian
model, households purchase more of the remaining tradeable goods (because imports
are cheaper), so that overall consumption increases, even though they do not gain
access to more varieties; (b) in the monopolistic competition model, households start
consuming a greater variety of goods. For any country, if the trade elasticity implied
by the two models were the same, then the gain from consuming a larger quantity of
imported goods in the Ricardian model would be the same as the gain from consuming
more imported varieties in frameworks à la Melitz (2003). To put it di¤erently, with
identical trade elasticities, "Ricardos intensive margin" would be equal to "Melitzs
extensive margin".4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, which
extends Eaton and Kortum (2002) to general distributions of industry e¢ ciencies. Sec-
tion 3 shows that the welfare gains induced by international trade can be decomposed
into two distinct e¤ects, related to the selection of industries and the reallocation of
workers. Section 4 introduces the assumption of Fréchet-distributed industry e¢ cien-
cies, shows that the analytical expressions of the two e¤ects simplify, and quanties
them for a sample of countries and years. Section 5 draws the main conclusions.
4We recall, however, the important caveat, established by Simonovska and Waugh (2014a), that
di¤erent trade models have di¤erent implications about the value of the trade elasticity. These authors,
in particular, report point estimates of the trade elasticity that are in a range between 4:0 and 4:6
for the Eaton-Kortum model (see their tables 2 and 3) and between 3:6 and 3:7 for the Melitz model
(table 4). This result would imply that welfare gains (which are decreasing in the trade elasticity)
are somewhat higher in the latter model. Nevertheless, the empirical question concerning the value of
the trade elasticities (and, in turn, of the gains from trade) in the two models seems to be still wide
open. Other papers, in fact, do nd lower values of the trade elasticity for the Eaton-Kortum model,
reporting estimates as low as 3:6 (Eaton and Kortum, 2002) and 2:8 (Simonovska and Waugh, 2014b).
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2 The model
We consider a continuum of tradable goods, indexed by j 2 [0;+1), that can poten-
tially be produced in any of the N countries of the world economy. Each good j can be
produced in country i with an e¢ ciency zi (j) that, in turn, is dened as the amount of
output that can be produced with one unit of input  where both output and input
are measured in units of constant quality. Any country has a xed labor endowment Li.
Inputs include labor as well as a bundle of intermediates goods, which comprises the
full set of tradable goods j.5 Technology is described by a Cobb-Douglas production
function with constant returns to scale, in which labor has a constant share   1 for
all industries and countries; namely:
qi (j) = zi (j)L

i (j) I
1 
i (j) , (1)
where qi (j) is the quantity of output j in country i, Li (j) is the number of workers,
and Ii (j) is the quantity of the bundle of intermediate goods.
Consumer preferences are the same across countries. The representative consumer
in country i purchases individual goods in amounts ci(j) in order to maximize a CES
utility function:
Ui =
hR
[ci(j)]
 1
 dj
i 
 1
,
where  > 0 is the elasticity of substitution. While the model allows us to deal with
both inelastic (  1) and elastic demand ( > 1), we will focus on the latter case,
because the goods that we consider are all tradable and, in this setting, the typical
calibration is  > 1.6
Consumers maximize their utility function subject to a standard budget con-
straint. Because we assume that trade is balanced in the open economy, income avail-
able for consumption is Yi = wiLi, where wi is the (nominal) wage.
International trade is constrained by barriers, which are modeled using the stan-
dard assumption of iceberg costs; i.e., delivering one unit of a good from country i to
country n requires shipping dni units, with dni > 1 for i 6= n and dii = 1 for any i. By
arbitrage, trade barriers obey the triangle inequality, so that dni  dnk  dki for any n,
i and k.
Perfect competition implies that the price of one unit of good j produced by
5We can ignore physical capital in the production function because the model is static and, then,
intermediate inputs play a very similar role.
6For an extension of the model that encompasses both tradable and non-tradable goods, see Di
Nino, Eichengreen, and Sbracia (2013).
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country n and delivered to country i is:
pin (j) =
cndin
zn (j)
,
where cn = wnp
1 
n is the cost of one unit of input in the source country n, with pn
being the unit price of the optimal bundle of intermediate goods, which is the same as
the unit price of the optimal bundle of nal goods (see equation (3) below). In other
words, we assume (as Eaton and Kortum, 2002) that producers combine intermediate
goods using the same CES aggregator that consumers use to combine nal goods.
Consumers purchase each good from the country that can supply it at the lowest
price; therefore, the price of good j in country i is:
pi (j) = min
n

cndin
zn (j)

.
We assume that, in each country i, industry e¢ ciencies zi(j) are the realiza-
tions of a random variable Zi, with a country-specic cumulative distribution function
(c.d.f.) Fi. Because the zi (j) represent industry e¢ ciencies and there is a continuum
of goods, it is natural to assume that Zi is non-negative and absolutely continuous
for each country i. These are the only conditions that we impose, in this and in the
following section, on the Zis (in Section 4, instead, we assume that the Zi are Fréchet
distributed). As the expert reader may have noticed, we do not impose the standard
restriction that the Zi are mutually independent across countries, but we allow for
dependent (correlated) variables.
The continuum-of-goods assumption and the conventional application of the law
of large numbers imply that the share of goods for which country is e¢ ciency is below
any real number z is the probability Pr (Zi < z) = Fi (z). It is worth noting that,
in the autarky economy, all goods are made at home and, then, Zi is the e¢ ciency
distribution of the closed economy.
Given the cost of inputs, the distribution of industry e¢ ciencies translates into a
distribution of good prices. More formally, let us denote with Pi the random variable
that describes the distribution of good prices in country i; this random variable is
dened as:
Pi = min
n

cndin
Zn

=

max
n

Zn
cndin
 1
. (2)
The price index in country i, pi, computed using the correct CES aggregator, is simply
the moment of order 1   of the random variable Pi, at the 1= (1  ) power; that is:
pi =

E
 
P 1 i
1=(1 )
. (3)
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After a simple manipulation of equations (2) and (3), we obtain:
pi = ci 

E
 
M 1i
1=(1 )
,
where Mi = max
n

ci
cn
Zn
din

, (4)
that leads to the real wage, which measures welfare:7
wi
pi
=

E
 
M 1i
1=( 1)
. (5)
The welfare gain from trade can be obtained by comparing the real wage of the
open and the closed economy, where the latter can be obtained from the former, letting
din ! +1 for i 6= n (using equations (4) and (5)). In this case, we have Mi ! Zi and
the real wage is

E
 
Z 1i
1=( 1)
. Hence, the gain from trade for country i is:
gi =
"
E
 
M 1i

E
 
Z 1i
 #1=( 1) . (6)
Equation (6) shows that the welfare gain arises from the transformation, that occurs
in the open economy, of the "source of the production e¢ ciencies" (e¢ ciencies that,
in turn, determine good prices) from Zi to Mi. Note, in particular, that the latter
random variable is a maximum between a set of random variables that includes also Zi.
Because the maximum of a set of random variables rst-order stochastically dominates
any variable included in the set, then Mi  Zi, so that gi  1.8 In other words,
the real wage is higher in the open economy. Thus, the result that trade is welfare
improving is here proven using the language of probability, rather than the tools of
general equilibrium.9
3 Welfare decomposition
Let us now focus on how labor units are reallocated after opening to trade. To fos-
ter intuition, we start by considering the case of two countries, say i and n, before
generalizing the result to N countries.
7Recall that, in the competitive equilibrium of both the open and the closed economy, welfare is
wiLi=pi, where Li is exogenous.
8We remind the reader that the random variable X rst-order stochastically dominates the random
variable Y , and we write X  Y , if and only if FX (z)  FY (z) for any z 2 R, where FX and FY are
the c.d.f. of, respectively, X and Y . If this condition holds, then E
 
Xk
  E  Y k, for any k > 0.
9The nding that gi  1 for any i, proven using basic probability theory, generalizes a result of
Finicelli, Pagano, and Sbracia (2013a), extending it to a framework in which there are also intermediate
goods.
8
3.1 A 2-country example
The rst-order conditions (FOCs) of the consumers problem imply that the consump-
tion of good j in country i is:
ci (j) =

pi (j)
pi
 
 Ui , (7)
where Ui = wiLi=pi is the level of utility achieved by country i.
The FOCs of the producers problem, on the other hand, imply that the quan-
tities of labor and intermediate goods used to produce good j in country i are chosen
according to the following proportions:
Ii (j) =
1  

wi
pi
Li (j) . (8)
By aggregating across industries both sides of equation (8), we nd that the overall
amount of intermediate goods used in country i is Ii =
1 

 (wi=pi)  Li.
The assumption that intermediate goods are combined using the same CES ag-
gregator used to combine nal goods implies that, for any country i, the demand for
j as intermediate good, mi (j), is proportional to the demand as consumption good,
ci (j); that is: ci (j) =Ui = mi (j) =Ii. Because Ii=Ui = (1  ) =, it follows that, in
country i, the demand for good j as an intermediate input is mi (j) = (1  ) ci (j) =.
Hence, in any country i, the overall demand for good j is ci (j) =.
In the two-country model that we are examining, each good can either be pro-
duced abroad and imported at home; or be produced at home and sold only in the
domestic market; or be produced at home and sold both in the domestic and the
foreign market. Therefore, the resource constraint for country i requires that:
qi (j) =
8><>:
0 if j 2 Oi;z
1

ci (j) if j 2 Oi;d
1

[ci (j) + cn (j) dni] if j 2 Oni;e
, (9)
for any j, where Oi;z denotes the set of "zombie" industries of country i, i.e. those
industries that shut down right after trade liberalization;10 Oi;d is the set of industries
that sell their goods only on the domestic market; and Oni;e is the set of industries
that sell both at home and in country n:11 By construction, the sets Oi;z, Oi;d, and
10We borrow the terminology "zombie industries" from Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap (2008), who
use it to refer to industries that are kept alive only by misdirected or subsidized bank lending. In the
context of our model, instead, these industries would be kept alive by trade protectionist policies.
11In the two-country model, these sets are dened as follows: Oi;z =
n
j : zi(j)ci >
zn(j)
cndin
o
, Oi;d =n
j : zn(j)cndin 
zi(j)
ci
> zn(j)dnicn
o
, and Oni;e =
n
j : zi(j)ci 
zn(j)dni
cn
o
.
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Oni;e form a partition of the set of tradable goods; hence, the intersection between any
subset of them is empty and their union spans the whole set of tradable goods. The
set Oi;o  Oi;d [ Oni;e, on the other hand, includes the sole industries that survive
international competition.12
By plugging equations (1) and (7) into equation (9) (using also equation (8)),
and solving the resource constraint for the number of workers in industry j, we obtain:
Li (j) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if j 2 Oi;z
z 1i (j) 

wi
pi
(1 )
Li if j 2 Oi;d
z 1i (j) 

wi
pi
(1 )
Li  (1 + kni) if j 2 Oni;e
, (10)
where:
kni =
wnLn
wiLi

pidni
pn
1 
. (11)
The term kni measures the rise in the weight of the exporting relative to non-exporting
industries. It is related to the demand that comes from country n, since it depends
positively on the size of this country in terms of relative GDP, and negatively on the
iceberg cost between countries i and n, and their relative price levels.
In the autarky economy, Oi;z = Oni;e = ? and the resource constraint returns, for
any good j, Li (j) = z 1i (j)  (wi=pi)(1 ) Li. Let us consider, then, how labor is re-
allocated after trade liberalization. With respect to the autarky economy, in the open
economy the number of workers in the zombie industries goes to zero. The number of
workers in the industries that produce goods that are sold only domestically declines
(provided that  > 1), because these industries face a tougher competition, due to the
fact that imported goods are cheaper than those that were made at home under the
autarky regime.13 The number of workers in the exporting industries rises, absorb-
ing all the workers "in excess" from the other domestic industries. More specically,
these industries sell less in the domestic market (as international competition brings
in cheaper imported goods), so they would need less workers to serve this market, but
foreign demand allows them not only to keep their workers, but also to hire new ones
in order to produce more goods to be sold abroad.14
12The term cn (j) dni= in equation (9) represents the foreign demand that benets only the export-
ing industries. In particular, the representative consumer of country n demands the quantity cn (j) =,
but iceberg costs imply that dni units must be shipped from country i to deliver one unit of good to
country n. Thus, the overall quantity produced to serve the latter market is cn (j) dni=.
13If  < 1 ( = 1), industries producing goods that are sold only at home would employ more (the
same number of) workers.
14For j 2 Oni;e, the two terms of equation (10) represent exactly these factors: the number of workers
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Notice that, in any industry, the number of workers is proportional to the e¢ -
ciency of this industry, at the    1 power (i.e. to z 1i (j)). By aggregating across
industries both sides of equation (10), we can derive the following decomposition of the
real wage (which is proven in Appendix A for the general N -country case):
wi
pi
=
24i;o  E  Z 1i;o | {z }
selection
+ i;e  kni  E
 
Z 1i;e;n
| {z }
reallocation
351=( 1) , (12)
where i;o is the probability that an industry of country i survives international com-
petition; i;e is the probability that it is also an exporter (with i;e  i;o);15 Zi;o is the
random variable that describes the e¢ ciencies of the surviving industries; and Zi;e;n
describes the e¢ ciencies of the industries that export in country n.
Equation (12) shows  together with equation (10), from which it is derived 
the two sources of welfare gains in this model. The rst one comes from impact of the
selection of industries due to international competition, that transforms the average
e¢ ciency of the economy from E(Z 1i ) into E(Z
 1
i;o ). The second one comes from the
reallocation of workers to the exporting industries, which provides a contribution to
welfare that is separate and additional to the previous one (measured by the second
term inside the square brackets on the right-hand side of (12)).16 This contribution
depends on the strength of foreign demand (as measured by kni) and is key to the result
that trade is welfare improving. In fact, although the real wage always rises after trade
openness, the average e¢ ciency does not necessarily rise.17 Hence, economies in which
average e¢ ciency is lower under trade openness, still benet from trade thanks to
this additional reallocation e¤ect. Under broad conditions about the distribution of
industry e¢ ciencies, however, also the selection e¤ect provides a positive contribution
to welfare and, in the next section, we discuss and quantify both e¤ects for one specic
model that fulls those conditions.18
in the exporting industry that serve the domestic market (which declines after trade liberalization)
and the number of workers hired to start servicing the foreign market.
15The triangle inequality implies that if an industry is an exporter, then it must necessarily sell its
goods also in its domestic market.
16The e¢ ciencies of the exporting industries are included also in Zi;o (that describes the e¢ ciency
of all the surviving industries, including the exporters). Therefore, the contribution of the reallocation
e¤ect is distinct from the one that comes from the selection e¤ect.
17In other words, the result that Mi  Zi implies that E
 
M 1i
  E  Z 1i  (i.e. welfare rises
after trade openness), even though E
 
Z 1i

can be either larger of smaller that E
 
Z 1i;o

(average
e¢ ciency does not necessarily rise).
18Finicelli, Pagano, and Sbracia (2013a) examine the theoretical conditions under which average
e¢ ciency across industries rises after opening to trade. In particular, they show that it always rises
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Before turning to the quantication, however, let us show how the result gener-
alizes to the case of many countries (N  2).
3.2 The N-country case
For the general multi-country framework, in Appendix A we prove that the real wage in
each country i has still two components, the selection e¤ect (SEi) and the reallocation
e¤ect (REi):
wi
pi
= (SEi +REi)
1=( 1) . (13)
The rst term inside the brackets of the right hand side of (13) has the same expression
as the corresponding term of the two-country case:
SEi = i;o  E
 
Z 1i;o

. (14)
The second term is now more cumbersome:
REi =
X
n6=i
i;e;n  kni  E
 
Z 1i;e;n

+
+
X
n 6=i;h 6=i;n 6=h
i;e;n;h  (kni + khi)  E
 
Z 1i;e;n;h

+
+:::+ i;e;1;:::;N  (k1i + :::+ kNi)  E
 
Z 1i;e;1;:::;N

, (15)
where i;e;n;h;:::;k is the probability that an industry of country i exports in (and only)
countries n, h, ..., and k; while Zi;e;n;h;:::;k is the distribution of the e¢ ciencies of these
industries.
As shown by equations (12) and (15), in both the cases N = 2 and N > 2 the
magnitude of the reallocation e¤ect is governed by kni (equation (11)). In particular,
kni and the size of the reallocation e¤ect are larger if country i is relatively more
productive (pi=pn is low), and if the destination market n is rich (wn=wi high), large
(Ln is high relative to Li) and not too far away (dni low). Thus, geography, which is
key in the Ricardian model as shown by Eaton and Kortum (2002), exerts its e¤ects
mostly through the reallocation of workers to the export sector.
In principle, quantifying the expressions of (14) and (15) is not an impossible task,
although it may be rather daunting. Given the joint distribution of (Z1; :::; ZN), in fact,
under very broad assumptions about the country distributions of industry e¢ ciencies; namely: (i) if
the distributions of e¢ ciencies are independent across countries; (ii) for many types of distributions,
if their correlations are su¢ ciently low; (iii) regardless of cross-country correlations, if industry e¢ -
ciencies belong to families of distributions that are widely used in the literature, such as the Fréchet,
Pareto and Lognormal.
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one can always derive the distribution of any of the Zi;e;n;h;:::;k, which are just univariate
conditional distributions (see Appendix A). However, in empirical applications their
number might be extremely large, making their computation a very challenging task.
With N countries, one has to compute the distributions of the e¢ ciencies for the
industries that export in each of the N   1 foreign countries, those for the industries
that export in all the possible N (N   1) =2 couples of countries, etc.. For instance,
in the 46-country application that we consider in the next section, one should have to
compute a total of more than 35,000 billions of di¤erent distributions (that is 2N 1 1).
In the next section, instead, we show that, by introducing an assumption that transform
our general Ricardian model into one of the quantitative trade models of Arkolakis,
Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012), the quantication of the two e¤ects simplies
dramatically.
4 Fréchet-distributed e¢ ciencies
We now assume that, in any country i, industry e¢ ciencies are Fréchet distributed,
with parameters Ti and ;19 hence, the probability that an industry of country i has an
e¢ ciency lower that a positive real number z is Fi(z) = exp
 Tiz 	. For the sake
of simplicity, we also assume that these distributions are mutually independent across
countries.20
The moment of order k of Zi is:
E
 
Zki

= T
k=
i   

   k


, (16)
which exists if and only if  > k, where   is Eulers Gamma function. Because welfare
is related to the moment of order   1 of Zi, we assume  >   1. The parameter Ti,
usually dened as the "state of technology" of country i, captures country is absolute
advantage: an increase in Ti relative to Tn implies an increase in the share of goods
that country i produces more e¢ ciently than country n. The shape parameter ,
19Kortum (1997) and Eaton and Kortum (2009) show that the Fréchet distribution emerges from
a dynamic model of innovation in which, at each point in time: (i) the number of ideas that arrive
about how to produce a good follows a Poisson distribution; (ii) the e¢ ciency conveyed by each idea
is a random variable with a Pareto distribution; (iii) rms produce goods using always the best idea
that has arrived to them.
20The key assumption is that industry e¢ ciencies are Fréchet distributed, while independence can
easily be relaxed. In particular, Eaton and Kortum (2002) propose a multivariate Fréchet distribution
for industry e¢ ciencies that allows for correlation across countries, and Finicelli, Pagano and Sbracia
(2013a) use it to compute the "productivity gains from trade" for di¤erent degrees of correlation.
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common to all countries, is inversely related to the dispersion of Zi. It is related to the
concept of comparative advantage because, in the Ricardian model, gains from trade
depend on the heterogeneity in e¢ ciencies. In this model, a decrease in  (i.e. higher
heterogeneity), coupled with mutual independence, generates larger gains from trade
for all countries.
An important property of the model with Fréchet-distributed e¢ ciencies is that
the price distribution in country i for the goods imported from country n is the same
for any n (and equal to Pi). Thus, for example, source countries with a higher state of
technology or lower iceberg costs exploit these advantages by selling a wider range of
goods to that country but, in the equilibrium, the price distributions of the goods that
the various foreign sources supply to the destination market i are identical (see Eaton
and Kortum, 2002, and Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare, 2012). A related
key property is that, in the open economy: Mi = Zi;o.21 Hence, equation (5) becomes:
wi
pi
=

E
 
Z 1i;o
1=( 1)
. (17)
We now show how the analytical decomposition of welfare simplies and how its
sources can be quantied under the Fréchet assumption. Combining equation (17) with
(13) and using equation (14), it turns out that:
REi = (1  i;o)  E
 
Z 1i;o

, (18)
while it is still SEi = i;o  E
 
Z 1i;o

.
The welfare gain induced by trade openness (equation (6)) becomes:
gi =
"
E
 
Z 1i;o

E
 
Z 1i
#1=( 1) ,
that, in turn, can be decomposed as:
gi =
26664i;o  E
 
Z 1i;o

E
 
Z 1i
| {z }
selection
+ (1  i;o) 
E
 
Z 1i;o

E
 
Z 1i
| {z }
reallocation
37775
1=( 1)
.
In other words, given the overall gain from trade gi, a share i;o of the gain is due to
the selection e¤ect, while its complement, 1  i;o, is due to the reallocation e¤ect.22
21If the random variables X  Frechet (; ) and Y  Frechet (; ) are independent, then
max (X;Y )  XjX  Y  Frechet ( + ; ).
22In interpreting the shares of the welfare gain due to the selection and the reallocation e¤ect, we can
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We can now turn to the measurement. The properties of the Fréchet distribution
imply that Zi;o is still a Fréchet, with parameters i and , where:23
i = Ti +
X
i 6=k
Tk

ckdik
ci
 
.
It follows that:24
E
 
Z 1i;o

E
 
Z 1i
 = i
Ti
( 1)=
.
To quantify gi, we borrow from Finicelli, Pagano and Sbracia (2013a, Proposition 5)
the result that:
i = Ti  
i
where 
i  1 + IMP i
PROi   EXP i , (19)
in which IMPi is the value of country is aggregate imports, PROi is the value of its
production, and EXPi is the value of aggregate exports. Thus:
gi = (
i)
1= . (20)
This is the same result established by Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012)
for the larger class of quantitative trade models. In fact, 
 1i , which is equal to one
minus the import penetration ratio, is the so-called "trade domestic share" (i.e. the
share of expenditure on domestic goods), while in this Ricardian model the trade
elasticity is .
The quantication of the selection and the reallocation e¤ect can be completed
once that we derive i;o, which is the probability that an industry of country i survives
international competition. Using the properties of the Fréchet distribution, it is easy
to nd that:
i;o =
Ti (ci)
 P
k Tk (ckdik)
  =
1

i
(21)
safely ignore the complication due to the exponent 1= (   1). In fact, a monotone transformation of
the utility function, such as the one that can be obtained by taking Ui at the  (   1) power, would
yield the same equilibrium quantities and relative prices. In this transformed model, then, welfare
would be the same as in the original model, but at the  (   1) power, making the exponent of the
gain from trade equal to 1 (while leaving the base unchanged).
23The result follows immediately from the property described in footnote 22 and the fact that if
X  Frechet (; ) and a > 0, then aX  Frechet  a; .
24Note that i > Ti. In other words, if industry e¢ ciencies are Fréchet distributed, then the average
e¢ ciency of the surviving industries is always higher than that of the whole set of domestic industries
(i.e. of the set that includes also the industries that shut down after trade liberalization). This feature
of the "quantitative Ricardian trade model" is both consistent with the available empirical evidence
and it is shared by a large class of Ricardian models (see footnote 15).
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Note that, because welfare gains are increasing in 
i, it follows that, when gains
are larger, the selection e¤ect is less important and the reallocation e¤ect is more
important. This result can be readily explained. When gains from trade are small, the
selection e¤ect matters mostly because there are few exporters in the domestic economy
and, then, the possibilities of reallocating workers in these industries are fewer. On
the other hand, as the export sector grows and the gains from trade increase, the
importance of the reallocation e¤ect also rises because exporting industries (which are
on average more productive) absorb more workers.
What does real data show about the size of these two e¤ects? Table 1 provides
a quantication of the welfare gains from trade as well as the contribution of the
selection and reallocation e¤ect for a sample of 46 advanced and developing countries
in two di¤erent years, 2000 and 2005. Gains are computed using equation (20), taking
the value of the main parameters from literature. In particular, we assume that the
shape parameter is  = 4, as advocated by Simonovska and Waugh (2014b), and the
share of intermediate goods in production is  = 0:33, a conventional measure of the
share of value added in total output. The share of the gains from trade pertaining
to the selection and reallocation e¤ects, respectively equal to i;o and 1   i;o, are
computed using equation (21).
Given that the Ricardian theory laid out in this paper best describes trade in
manufactures, rather than in natural resources or primary goods, we follow the litera-
ture and consider data on the values of domestic production, exports and imports 
which is all is needed to compute the gains from trade as well as the contribution of
their sources  all referred to the manufacturing sector. In addition, given that the
model assumes that trade is balanced, in the application we impose that exports are
identical to imports (equal to their average).
For each year, Table 1 shows the percentage increase in welfare due to interna-
tional trade and the shares (in percentage) due to the selection and the reallocation
e¤ect. Results show that gains from trade are considerable (for the cross-country av-
erage welfare is almost 60 and 70 percent higher than in autarky in 2000 and 2005).
As it is well known, the size of the gains is quite sensitive to the assumptions about
the value of the shape parameter and the share of intermediate goods in production.
For instance, by taking  = 6:66 instead of  = 4 (as Alvarez and Lucas, 2007), the
gains would be about 60 percent of those reported in Table 1. By the same token, in
the model without intermediate goods ( = 1), gains from trade would be about one
third of those reported in the table.
Overall, the size of the selection e¤ect is somewhat more important than the real-
location e¤ect in our sample of countries (it is close to 60 percent in the year 2000 and
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Table 1: Gains from trade and their sources (1)
Welfare gain
(%)
Selection
effect (%)
Reallocation
effect (%)
Welfare gain
(%)
Selection
effect (%)
Reallocation
effect (%)
OECD countries
Australia 30 70 30 40 64 36
Austria 111 37 63 147 30 70
Belgium-Luxembourg 70 50 50 94 43 57
Canada 87 44 56 74 48 52
Chile 30 70 30 27 73 27
Czech Republic 73 48 52 90 43 57
Denmark 129 33 67 163 28 72
Estonia n.a. n.a. n.a. 242 20 80
Finland 49 59 41 57 55 45
France 44 62 38 49 59 41
Germany 50 59 41 59 54 46
Greece 63 52 48 63 53 47
Hungary 116 36 64 137 32 68
Ireland 133 33 67 151 30 70
Israel 65 52 48 81 46 54
Italy 28 72 28 29 72 28
Japan 11 87 13 13 86 14
Korea 29 72 28 23 76 24
Mexico 45 61 39 47 60 40
Netherlands 226 21 79 n.a. n.a n.a.
New Zealand 49 59 41 53 57 43
Norway 66 51 49 68 50 50
Poland 40 64 36 53 57 43
Portugal 56 56 44 67 51 49
Slovak Republic 95 41 59 136 32 68
Slovenia 108 38 62 150 30 70
Spain 37 66 34 41 63 37
Sweden 65 52 48 73 49 51
Switzerland 102 39 61 118 36 64
Turkey 30 71 29 24 75 25
United Kigdom 49 59 41 72 49 51
United States 17 81 19 23 76 24
Non-OECD countries
Argentina 24 76 25 27 73 27
Brazil 10 88 12 11 87 13
Bulgaria 44 62 38 63 53 47
China 12 87 13 16 83 17
Taiwan 46 60 40 58 55 45
India 13 85 15 23 76 24
Indonesia 32 69 31 24 75 25
Malaysia 55 56 44 56 56 44
Romania 50 59 41 68 50 50
Russian Federation 17 81 19 23 77 24
Singapore 24 36 64 n.a. n.a. n.a.
South Africa 25 75 25 26 74 26
Thailand n.a. n.a. n.a. 50 59 41
Vietnam 61 53 47 n.a. n.a. n.a.
mean 57 59 41 68 56 44
median 49 59 41 57 55 45
max 226 88 79 242 87 80
min 10 21 12 11 20 13
Year 2000 Year 2005
Source: authorscalculations on OECD STAN data.
(1) Real wage relative to the autarky economy (values of (gi 1)%) and contributions of the
selection and the reallocation e¤ect (in percentage).
17
around 55 per cent in 2005). It is worth noting that, unlike the gains from trade, the two
shares remain unchanged irrespectively of the exact value of  and . Unsurprisingly,
the reallocation e¤ect is more important in small open economies, such as Denmark,
Estonia, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. For
these countries, the share of the welfare gains pertaining to the reallocation e¤ect is
above 70 percent in at least one year. On the other hand, for large and relatively more
closed countries, it is the selection e¤ect that it is dominant. For instance, among the
OECD economies, only the United States and Japan record a share of the welfare gains
pertaining to the selection e¤ect above 80 percent in at least one year. Among non-
OECD economies, only the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) show
the same record as the United States and Japan.
5 Conclusion
This paper provides a deconstruction of the sources of the welfare gains from trade in a
Ricardian model. Under general distributions of industry e¢ ciencies, welfare gains arise
from two distinct sources. The former is an e¤ect due to the selection of industries that
survive international competition. The latter is related to the reallocation of workers
away from the industries that shut down, as well as from those selling only in the
domestic market, to the industries that start servicing the foreign market. If industry
e¢ ciencies are Fréchet distributed, so that the model becomes one of the quantitative
trade models of Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2012), these two e¤ects can
be easily measured.
Our results also show that the share of the welfare gains due the reallocation
e¤ect is larger, the larger is the welfare gain. Thus, countries that can potentially gain
more from trade  i.e. small open economies that are close to large, rich, and less
e¢ cient markets  would gain mostly from the reallocation e¤ect. Therefore, to fully
reap the benets from international trade, they must be ready to favor the reallocation
of resources towards exporting industries, for example supporting workerseducation
and training.
The key insight from our analysis, however, is that quantitative trade models
seem to be useful not only in order to assess the overall welfare gains, but also to
properly measure their sources  an issue that deserves to be further explored in
future studies tackling other models in this class. The route taken in this paper of
using quantitative trade models to measure not only the overall welfare gains from
trade, but also the contribution of their sources, appears to be a promising area for
theoretical and empirical research.
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Appendix
A Welfare decomposition with many countries
In order to prove equation (13), let us start by generalizing the resource constraint (9)
to a context with more than just two countries. As in the two-country case, we still
have: qi (j) = 0, if j 2 Oi;z and qi (j) = ci (j) =, if j 2 Oi;d. Now consider the set of
industries of country i that export in (and only) the countries n, h, ..., and k, for any
fn; h; :::; kg 2 f1; :::; Ng n fig, and denote this set by On;h;:::;ki;e ;25 the resource constraint
for these industries becomes:
qi (j) =
1

[ci (j) + cn (j) dni + ch (j) dhi + :::+ ck (j) dki] .
Solving the resource constraint for the number of workers in industry j, we obtain:
Li (j) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if j 2 Oi;z
z 1i (j) 

wi
pi
(1 )
Li if j 2 Oi;d
z 1i (j) 

wi
pi
(1 )
Li  (1 + kni + khi + :::+ kki) if j 2 On;h;:::;ki;e
, (22)
where the terms kli are dened as in equation (11), for any destination market l.
Note that the sets Oi;z, Oi;d, O
n;h;:::;k
i;e (for any fn; h; :::; kg as above) form a par-
tition of the set of tradable goods. By aggregating across industries both sides of
equation (22), we obtain the following:
wi
pi
( 1)
= i;dE
 
Z 1i;d

+:::+i;e;n;h;:::;k(1 + kni + khi + :::+ kki)E
 
Z 1i;e;n;h;:::;k

+:::
(23)
where i;d is the probability that an industry of country i survives international compe-
tition and serves only the domestic market (i.e. i;d = Pr(Zi 2 Oi;d)); i;e;n;h;:::;k is the
probability that an industry of country i exports in (and only) countries n, h, ..., and
k (i.e. i;e;n;h;:::;k = Pr(Zi 2 On;h;:::;ki;e )); Zi;e;n;h;:::;k is the distribution of the e¢ ciencies
of these industries (i.e. Zi;e;n;h;:::;k = ZijZi 2 On;h;:::;ki;e ). Considering that:
i;o  E
 
Z 1i;o

= i;d  E
 
Z 1i;d

+ :::+ i;e;n;h;:::;k  E
 
Z 1i;e;n;h;:::;k

+ ::: ,
25The analytical denition of On;h;:::;ki;e is as follows: this set includes all the industries that export
in countries n, h, ..., and k, i.e. those for which zi (j) =ci > zl (j) dli=cl, for l = n; h; :::; k; and excludes
those that export in countries di¤erent from n, h, ..., and k, i.e. those for which zi (j) =ci < zl (j) dli=cl
for l 6= n; h; :::; k.
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we can conveniently rearrange the right-hand side of equation (23) into the sum of
two terms, given by equations (14) and (15). By taking the 1= (   1) power of both
sides, we nally obtain equation (13).
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